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With the rapid development in domestic insurance industry， insurance fraud is 
becoming more serious， of which insurance agent fraud has a broader and dangerous 
social impact. The reasons why insurance agent fraud is arising are not only a series 
of factors such as the imperfection of existing policies or regulations，  the 
ineffectiveness of monitoring  and the inexact positioning of insurance agents 
market， but also deeper factors based on asymmetric information the principal-agent 
relationship itself. In this paper， according to these two aspects， it proposes that 
from the market and system as well as principal-agent relationship under asymmetric 
information to analysis， using the principal-agent model conclusions as well as 
learning from foreign experience，  combined with the actual situation to take 
measures to reduce insurance agent fraud. 
In purpose of established research，  this paper consists of five chapters.  
Chapter 1 introduces the background and research significance of this paper， and it 
unscrambles relevant articles about insurance fraud both home and abroad， which 
lays a ground for the following research. Chapter 2 describes the theory of 
asymmetric information and the forms of insurance fraud， and then it analyzes the 
meaning of insurance fraud in the views of laws and economics. At the same time， it 
proposes the concept of the insurance fraud restrict in the view of insurance industry 
corporate governance. Chapter 3 focuses on the insurance agent fraud， discussing the 
performance and influence of agent fraud， and then it emphasizes the causes of agent 
fraud in side of the market and the system， as well as principal-agent relationship. In 
the end， we try to propose some measures and views to solve agent-related fraud 
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第一节  选题背景及研究意义 
二十世纪 80 年代以来，我国保险业始终保持着 30％左右的年均增长速度，




















                                                        









































J．Mirrlees 在 1974 年至 1976 年的三篇论文（1974b，1975，1976c）中，开





































型；Bachir and Georges（1997）利用专家系统（Expert System）对加拿大的保险
欺诈进行识别；Caudill（2005）应用 LOGIT 模型对美国机动车保险欺诈进行识
别；Arits and Guillen（2002）利用离散选择模型（Discrete Choice Models）对西
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